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Qubole Data Breach: Customer AWS Accounts (Nov 2026)

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November 9, 2026: Security firm Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reported an attack involving Qubole. Between October 14 and 26, an attacker used a Qubole-linked AWS account to enter customer cloud accounts, read secrets and copy data. Qubole had not published its own notice when the report came out. See the Qubole breach record for details.

Qubole is a data-lake product owned by Idera. Data vendors like it often ask customers to create AWS roles that the vendor's own account can use. The attacker took advantage of that trust. Wiz says many affected customers had no normal Qubole traffic in October, yet their unused roles still accepted the attacker's requests.

What happened in the Qubole AWS incident?

The Wiz report says the attacker started using the Qubole-linked account on October 14. It sent requests from VPN and hosting services, not from AWS itself. Wiz says the genuine Qubole traffic it saw came from AWS, which made the attacker's activity stand out.

Once inside a customer account, the attacker mapped out storage, computing resources, databases and keys. It then read secrets from Lambda environment variables, AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store. Some of those secrets were tested against AWS, Microsoft Entra ID and Okta.

The attacker also copied data from S3 storage buckets. It listed the buckets, listed the files and then downloaded them, sometimes taking whole buckets in one session. Wiz calls the targeting opportunistic, meaning the attacker took whatever each role could reach.

Wiz also saw a smaller burst of activity from October 8 to 11. It used customer-owned access keys that Wiz believes were created for Qubole integrations, but Wiz could not link it to the main campaign. The Hacker News summarized the same timeline.

What data was exposed?

The exposed data depends on what each customer's Qubole role could read. Wiz names S3 files, cloud secrets and login credentials for identity services. No list of affected companies has been published, and there is no count of affected people.

Stolen cloud keys are the bigger long-term risk. A working AWS key or Okta secret can keep working after the attack window if it is not changed. Wiz notes that rotating a secret does not cancel temporary sessions that were already issued.

Who is affected?

The direct victims are organizations that created AWS roles trusting Qubole's account, especially roles left in place after they stopped using the service. People whose data sat in those S3 buckets could also be affected, but nobody has said who they are.

If you use a product from a company that runs Qubole, there is no public notice that your data was taken. Watch for a notice from that company. Updates on the vendor appear on the Qubole company page.

Did Qubole confirm the breach?

Not as of November 9, 2026. The report comes from Wiz, Sentra and Mandiant, not from Qubole or Idera. A detailed researcher report is strong evidence, but it is not the same as a company statement.

Other vendor-access incidents this year followed a similar pattern. In August, McKesson confirmed data theft through a third-party app. The developer platform WorkOS disclosed a sales-app incident the same week as the Qubole report.

What should Qubole customers do?

  1. Review your logs. Check CloudTrail role-assumption events from October 1, 2026, onward, using the hunting guidance in the Wiz report.
  2. Remove unused trust. Delete the trust for any Qubole integration you no longer use, since idle roles still answered the attacker.
  3. Rotate secrets. Change every secret, parameter and Lambda variable the role could read, and revoke active sessions for that role.
  4. Check S3 data events. Management events record the role assumption but not the downloads, so data event logs show which files were taken.
  5. Follow your support ticket. If you opened a case with Qubole, rely on it for account-specific details.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the Qubole breach?

Wiz, Sentra and Mandiant reported that an attacker used credentials from an AWS account linked to Qubole to enter customer cloud accounts between October 14 and 26, 2026. The attacker used AWS roles customers had created for Qubole, then read secrets and copied files from S3 storage.

Did Qubole confirm the breach?

Not as of November 9, 2026. The incident was reported by Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant. Qubole and its parent company Idera had not published a matching notice on the pages reviewed that day. The report is detailed, but it is not a company statement.

Was this a ransomware attack?

No. Wiz describes stolen credentials being used to enter customer AWS accounts, read secrets and copy data from storage buckets. The report does not mention encryption, a ransom demand or a ransomware group. Wiz calls the targeting opportunistic, because the attacker took whatever each role could reach.

How many people were affected?

Nobody knows yet. Wiz has not published a list of affected companies or a count of people whose data sat in the copied S3 buckets. The exposed data depends on what each customer's Qubole role could read, so only the affected customers can say what was taken.