November 16, 2026: An attacker planted malicious JavaScript in Optimizely Web projects, and Optimizely's own CDN served it to visitors of 178 organisations' websites, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom and Salesforce. For most of the day the code swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers and pushed iPhone visitors toward exploit kits. The incident is logged in the Optimizely OPTIMJACK breach record.
Optimizely Web is an A/B testing tool. Sites load a snippet from cdn.optimizely.com so marketers can change pages without a code release. That makes it one of the most trusted scripts on a page, and on 16 November it was the delivery route.
Researcher Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK after catching 15 page loads that fetched the payload. Scott Helme's team at Report URI then checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the code in 188 of them. Optimizely had not commented as of 17 November.
The published list is not complete. Any site running Optimizely Web should check its own projects, even if it is not named.
What happened in the Optimizely OPTIMJACK attack?
The timeline below is reconstructed by Report URI and StepSecurity from snippet captures, certificate logs and public scans. All times are UTC on 16 November.
- 04:21: the first injected code appears in the BBC's Optimizely snippet.
- 05:23: the payload domain
1688360.ccis registered, after certificates were issued from 04:28. - 08:28:
track.jsis first seen loading on bbc.com. Zoom's snippet is modified at 11:20. - 13:03: the attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges. A card skimmer is added to the payload at 13:43.
- 17:13 to 17:57: a second iOS host goes live and every visit from iOS 18.6 or older gets a hidden exploit iframe.
- 20:40 to 21:10: mass clean-up. By 21:52 only one of the 188 snippets, TalkTalk's, was still infected.
The attacker rebuilt track.js 26 times that day and kept adding wallets. When BreachHistory fetched twelve of the named Optimizely bundles on 17 November, none still contained the payload domain. A clean file today does not mean it was clean on the 16th.
How did the code get into Optimizely snippets?
Each Optimizely Web project has a Project JavaScript field that runs on every page where the snippet loads. The attacker wrote into that field and left the rest of each snippet alone. Report URI is clear that this was not cache poisoning: "Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given."
How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated projects is still unknown. The snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the code too, which makes a shared access path more likely than 178 separate account takeovers. That is an inference, not a finding. This is also separate from Optimizely's February 2026 vishing incident, and nobody has linked the two.
Researchers saw three loader styles:
- A plain script tag pointing at
https://1688360.cc/track.js. - The same URL hidden in base64 and decoded with
atob(). Smartsheet was cleaned and then re-infected with this version. - A full inline copy of the payload run through
eval, so blocking the domain alone did not help.
What did the track.js payload do?
The script ran with the same rights as the site's own code. It had four jobs.
Crypto address swapping
It looked for valid BTC, ETH, TRON, Solana, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE addresses and checked their checksums, so it only touched real ones. It swapped them only near words like "wallet", "deposit" or "send". It hooked page text, form inputs, links, copy events, the clipboard API, navigator.share and outgoing fetch and XHR requests. A user could copy a correct address and paste the attacker's.
Card skimming
It wrapped fetch, XHR and form submits and looked for a Luhn-valid card number with a known brand prefix, an expiry date and a 3 or 4 digit CVV. Matches went to /card.php through navigator.sendBeacon and were cached in sessionStorage under keys starting with cc_. Hosted payment iframes from providers like Stripe and Adyen were out of reach. Cards typed into a site's own form were not.
Cookie and screenshot theft
After a swap near payment wording, it loaded html2canvas, took a JPEG of the page and posted it to /hit.php. The post included the URL, up to 8,000 characters of cookies and the original addresses. HttpOnly cookies were safe.
iPhone exploit kits
On iPhone and iPad it loaded boot.js routers from .icu domains. Report URI maps iOS 13 to 17 to the Coruna kit, iOS 18 to DarkSword and iOS 26 to a fingerprinting stage. Hudson Rock's analysis of the iOS stage stresses that these are delivery observations, not proof that devices were compromised. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 are patched.
Which websites and visitors were affected?
Report URI's list covers 178 organisations: 32 in banking and finance, 23 in technology, 20 in retail, plus news, airlines, healthcare and crypto firms. Names include the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. The team says "the real number is likely higher."
Not every Optimizely customer was hit. The code turned up in 188 of the 1,611 snippets Report URI checked, and nobody has explained why those projects were chosen. The list is also incomplete, because researchers could only check snippets they already knew about. If your site runs Optimizely Web and is not on the list, check your projects anyway.
The visible losses are small so far. About $7,040 in crypto reached the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC, most of it one Bitcoin payment worth about $4,970. StepSecurity's count is about $6,600. Card, cookie and iOS losses do not show up on a blockchain and are unknown.
Content Security Policy only helped where it was strict. Report URI reviewed the affected sites and found that most had no policy at all, or one loose enough to let the payload run and send data out. Only a small share blocked it outright.
This is the same pattern as the OptinMonster CDN supply-chain attack and the Convertr checkout skimmer: one trusted script, many victims.
What should site owners and visitors do?
If your site uses Optimizely Web
- Open every project's Project JavaScript and experiment custom code. Search for
1688360,atob(,.icuand any script you did not add. - Review who can write to your Optimizely account, including API tokens and integrations, and rotate the credentials.
- Search proxy, DNS and CSP report logs for
1688360.ccand the.icuhosts from 04:00 UTC on 16 November. - Treat cards entered on your own forms that day as exposed, and rotate any session tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies.
- Restrict
connect-src, dropunsafe-eval, turn on CSP reporting and keep third-party tags off checkout pages.
If you visited an affected site on 16 November
- Update iOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later. A page that reloaded itself every 60 seconds on an older iPhone is a warning sign.
- Check recent crypto transfers against the address you meant to use, and confirm addresses on your hardware wallet screen.
- Watch your card statements if you typed card details into a site's own checkout that day.
Indicators of compromise
- Payload host:
1688360.cc(136.113.106.136) with/track.js,/card.php,/hit.phpand/html2canvas.min.js. - iOS routers:
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu,eil786npto9u5bq.icu,l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu,p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu,1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu,gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu; paths/JIUJIU888/weifile.htmland/A8/a.html. - Earlier wave:
webshell.lol/get.js, loaded through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts from 13 November. - track.js SHA-256 (final build):
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40. - Browser markers:
window._k7,sessionStoragekeys starting withcc_, anddata-channel-code="02111110".
Frequently asked questions
Was Optimizely hacked?
Optimizely has not said. Researchers found the malicious code inside the Project JavaScript of customer projects, served from Optimizely's own CDN. That points to someone gaining write access to those projects, but nobody has published how. Optimizely's own snippets for its website and login page carried the code too.
Which websites were affected?
Report URI counted 178 organisations with infected snippets, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Ledger. The count is a floor, because researchers could only check snippets they already knew about. None of the named companies has commented publicly.
I visited one of these sites on November 16. Am I affected?
Probably not, unless you copied a crypto address, entered card details into a form hosted by the site itself, or used an iPhone on iOS 18.6 or older. Check recent crypto transfers, watch your card statement and update iOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later.
Would a Content Security Policy have stopped it?
Partly. A strict script-src allowlist could block it, because the payload loaded from a domain no site had approved. Policies using strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval let it run, since a trusted script added it. A tight connect-src could stop card and cookie theft, but address swapping happens inside the page, so it still worked.